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PROFIT SHARING AND PENSION PLANS IN CANADA
1. INTRODUCTION
This article will describe the legal environment surrounding profit
sharing and pension plans in Canada.' Central to this statement is a
detailed summary of those legal restrictions affecting investment
de'isions, and more particularly the use of monies in equity
participation. 2 That is, a decision having been made to establish a
profit sharing or pension plan, how may the funds flowing into the
scheme be invested?
Before specific legislation touching upon investment decisions can
be discussed, certain primary matters must be developed. First, who
has the power to decide whether and how a profit sharing or pension
scheme will operate? Is management to assume an inherent right to
initiate, modify, and direct the flow of monies into such schemes? In
part the answers to these questions will be found in labor law, and
more particularly the demands of collective bargaining.
Second, management must know to whose jurisdiction it is subject.
A business, operating in several provinces, implementing a single
profit sharing or pension plan, might have some difficulty if it is
confronted with conflicting federal and provincial legislation. Thus, it
becomes necessary to examine the jurisdictional setting and federal
involvement in the control over profit sharing and pension plans.
A separate section will discuss the Income Tax Act. The tax
treatment of pension funds will be contrasted with that of profit
sharing plans. Apart from differences in definition, the tax
alternatives for either choice will be presented.
Finally, provincial regulation is set forth. Primary emphasis is
given to Ontario legislation not merely because it has served as a
model for many other provinces, but also because of its industrial
strength. The law of Quebec, under which a somewhat different
environment has been created, also is included in this presentation. 3
From a practical view, an effort is made to answer that most
important question: Is there uniformity of regulation?
2. THE ROLE OF LABOR LAW
Profit sharing and pension plans possess certain common
characteristics. Both generally are addressed to employees. Each,
offering a form of compensation, can induce employee loyalty, tenure,
1. The term "pension funds" is meant to refer to private pension plans. Those plans
pursuant to Special Acts of the Federal or Provincial Parliaments are to be
distinguished.
2. The term "pension fund industry" also refers to the industry of private pension
plans.
3. The Quebec Pension Plan and the Supplemental Pension Plans Act, infra at 48.
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and, perhaps, efficiency. Yet there is no necessary assurance that all
or any of these characteristics will come into being. For that matter,
there is even the possibility that the characteristics might not
harmonize with each other. Is it not possible to have an industry where
high employee turnover is desirable and efficient? Indeed, is it not
possible to have an industry where the youngest, those with the least
seniority, might represent not only the cheapest labor, but also the
most productive? If so, a profit sharing or pension plan geared to pass
greater rewards to those possessing the most seniority from
management's view, could be self-defeating.
Nevertheless, whatever management's view, whatever the goals of a
profit sharing or pension plan, there is an overriding consideration:
What will the law allow? Any plan, any exercise of business judgment,
must comport with public policy as expressed in law. The thrust of this
paper is to state clearly that policy. In doing so, it would be desirable if
there were a single, well-stated law, called the public policy of profit
sharing and pension plans. There is not. There is instead multiple
legislation at federal and provincial levels designed to achieve diverse
ends.
A beginning point could be the developed law governing labor
disputes. In 1968 the Ontario Royal Commission Inquiry Into Labour
Disputes, terming the strike device "a residual of the primordial
struggle," called profit-sharing "theoretically, and . . . practicably,
the most effective" way of achieving industrial peace. To the Royal
Commission profit sharing results in:
giving the employee a sense of genuine participation in what
is viewed as a life work. The employee, as part owner, feels
that interest, the spur to increased efficiency and gradually
increasing return. With expanding administrative consultation,
these plans offer both an attitude towards and a broadened
view of the employer-employee relations that exist today;
and experience shows that these schemes are not incom-
patible with unionism, labour's security. 4
The Ontario Royal Commission made proposals outside the ambit of
labor legislation. The comment on profit sharing had little to do with
the statutory scheme of industrial government. That scheme is
designed not to regulate, but rather to allow groups of individuals to
band together for the purpose of selecting a representative empowered
4. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION INQUIRY INTO LABOUR DIsPUTEs (The Rand Report)
42-44 (Queen's Printer, 1968).
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to bargain as of right with management.5 The law imposes, in this
regard, an affirmative duty on management to bargain in good faith:
The intent of the statute is to provide a vehicle whereby labor
'and management can resolve their differences in an orderly,
mutually protective manner to the extent that where the
differences are a legitimate and honest stand on the part of
each party, and all reasonable efforts to resolve them have
been exhausted, then the right to strike or lockout comes into
effect. The test as to reasonableness and honesty or good faith
of a party is an objective one. 6
At the extremes, good faith bargaining and objectivity can be
measured, and the law can recognize and condemn those blatant
attempts of refusal to bargain, coupled with employee wage bonuses,
all aimed at destroying the union. This was done in Regina v.
Daridson Ritbber Co., IAc., where the court stated:
The Company through its representatives and their take it or
leave it attitude, their reluctance to meet with the Union
representatives to negotiate an agreement, their dealing
directly with employees with full knowledge of the
certification of the Union as sole bargaining agent, all went
beyond the realm of tough bargaining and were a deliberate
attempt on the part of the Company to undermine and destroy
the Union as a force within the plant ....
5. CANADIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, THE REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LABOUR
RELATIONS 117 (Privy Council Office, 1968):
One cannot assume a correlation between the results of collective bargaining
and any particular concept of equity. Collective bargaining is basically a
power struggle; the outcome is more a reflection of the relative economic
positions of the protagonists than of the merits of their claims and
counterclaims in terms of some standard of equity.
6. Regina v. Davidson Rubber Co., Inc., [1970] 1 Ont. 6, 18 (Ont. Prov. Ct.). Except for
those matters related to peace, order, and good government, and those areas of the
economy specifically subject to federal control (such as banking and broadcasting) the
legislative power over labor relations rests with the provinces. The federal government
and provinces all have used their powers to provide for collective bargaining as the key
to labor public policy. See The Alberta Labour Act, ALTA. REV. STAT. C. 167, § 55(1) (b)
(1955); The Labour Relations Act, B. C. REV. STAT. c. 205, §§ 2(1), 18 (1960); The Labour
Relations Act, MAN. REV. STAT. C. 132, §§ 2(1)(e), 14(1954); The Labour Relations Act,
NEWF. REV. STAT, c. 258, §§ 2(1(e), 14(1954); The Trade Union Act, N.S. REV. STAT. C.
295, §§ I(e), 14(1954); The Labour Relations Act, ONT. REV. STAT. C. 202, § 12 (1960); The
Industrial Relations Act, STAT. PR. EDW. IS. C. 18, §§ 1 (e), 17 (1962); The Labour
Code, QUE. REV. STAT. C. 141, § 41 (1964); The Trade Union Act, SASK. REV. STAT. c. 259,




TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW FORUM
Still, the burden rests on the prosecution to prove bad faith, partly
because of the quasi-criminal nature of an offense charged under, for
example, the Ontario act. This often is an extremely difficult task. Not
without reason are there few decisions covering good faith bargaining.
However, it would be a mistake to assume that management is without
constraint in the bargaining process. To do so would misconceive the
nature of that process. The right to bargain necessarily assumes the
right of the parties to resort to economic sanctions, including the right
to strike and lockout. All that the law imposes is a process that is
collective in nature. Under it the parties draft their own charter of
industrial government. Through the collective agreement they lay
down the terms and conditions of employment. The law, on the whole,
says nothing to them about the substantive terms of the agreement to
the extent that it has been committed to writing. Thus, for example,
the Labour Relations Act of Ontario declares a collective bargaining
agreement to be a contract "in writing between an employer ... and a
trade union ... containing provisions respecting terms or conditions of
employment in the rights, privileges or duties of the employer, the
employer's organization, the trade union or its employees." 1
The legislature having spoken, the judiciary is not to interfere. No
common law is to be read into the expressed terms of the union-
8. Both union and management have their own views as to how the written agreement
should be interpreted.
How does management usually phrase its tacit assumptions about the nature
and meaning of a collective agreement, which assumptions will grant it
freedom to pursue the values it believes important? It argues that management
begins with certain functions and prerogatives that preexisted collective
bargaining, the purpose of union bargaining is to obtain contractual
limitations on these "rights"; the eventual bargain involves an exchange that is
freely agreed to by very sophisticated negotiators; and that any other approach
to arbitral interpretation is in conflict with the policy of free collective
bargaining.
Unions unequivocally repudiate the suggestion that the pre-existing legal
position is carried over into the administration of the collective bargaining
agreement, to the extent that the latter does not expressly change this position.
Rather, they propose quite a different set of assumptions with which the
interpretation of the agreement ought to be approached in arbitration. Each of
the parties begins negotiating as an equal, with no pre-existing biases in its
favour. To the extent that the explicit bargain that is reached confers rights or
power on one side, it is legally permitted to enjoy them. To the extent there is
no explicit mention in the contract about a certain matter, then the status quo
at the beginning of the agreement, modified by practices that have been
accepted during the administration of the agreement, should be the criterion
for evaluating the legality of proposed employer action. This is true at least to
the extent that the employer action will substantially infringe on the integrity
of the bargaining unit and the proprietary rights in their jobs of the unit
incumbents. P. WEILzR, LABOUR ARBITRAnON AND INDUSTRIAL CHANGE, TASK
FORCE ON LABOUR RELATIONS, Study No. 6 at 5-6 (Privy Council Office, 1969).
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management contract. The parties are bound by statute and
agreement to resolve disputes of contract interpretation through
impartial arbitration. The Supreme Court of Canada on more than one
occasion has drawn a heavy line between interpretation and
substantive addition to the contract. As a matter of law the Court has
confined the industrial court, that is, the arbitration panel, to a sphere
with severe limitatio'ns that hinder the development of a new common
law for industry. The principle has been applied specifically to issues
arising from pension fund administration. The decisions posit a
judicial view not only of the arbitration process, but also of labor and
management. The Court's rulings are not to be overlooked by profit
sharing and pension planners.
On January 1, 1966, the Canada Pension Plan became effective. At
that time, speaking for the Government, Miss Judy La Marsh stated:
The Canada Pension Plan . . . is designed to make available
to all Canadians a satisfactory minimum standard of
pensions related to incomes up to an average level .... It is not
intended to provide all the retirement income which most
Canadians wish to have. People who now belong to pension
plans . . . will make further provision for their retirement,
beyond the Canada Pension Plan. How they do so, and to
what extent, is properly left to individual choice or collective
bargaining. The proper role of government is to provide a
floor.,'
By statute Government had set a floor for retirement pension. The
problem facing many employers was what to do with their already
existing welfare schemes, of which several were voluntary and in
being through unilateral action on the part of management. The
Hudson Bay Mining & Smelting Co., Ltd. found itself in such a
position. It had a plan under which employees contributed 3 percent of
their earnings, and the company added whatever was necessary to
provide an annual pension equal to 45 percent of the employee's total
contributions. Under the Canada Pension Plan at its inception
employees were to contribute 1.8 percent of their earnings. Hudson
Bay notified its employees that the 1.8 percent would come from the
monies put into the company pension, thereby reducing the employee
contribution to the private plan by more than half to 1.2 percent. It
9. Quoted by Lawrence E. Coward, Chairman, Pension Commission of Ontario,
Pensions in Canada, CCH Canada Ltd. 18 (1964); see also CAN. REv. STAT. c. 51(1964-65).
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should also be noted that the employer contribution was necessarily
lessened.10
Hudson Bay chose not to enlarge or diversify its retirement scheme,
although the Canada Pension Plan provided that theoretical
opportunity. Instead, the company opted for integration of benefits.
The union disputed management's right to do this under the collective
bargaining agreement despite the clear warnings issued by the
company to its employees in a booklet:
1. The company reserved the right to administer the plan and
"to decide all matters with respect thereto."
2. The company, save for those monies already contributed
and therefore deemed vested in the employees, reserved the
right to "change or discontinue the plan." I
Management initiated the pension. Management cautioned the
employees concerning company rights. How then could the union
challenge what had been done? The basis for attack came from the
collective bargaining agreement. It, not a welfare booklet issued by
the company, was deemed the primary instrument for ascertaining
rights and privileges. One article of that agreement bound the
company "in accordance with the terms of the present agreements"
not to discontinue its support of existing welfare programs, which
included the pension plan.
The question came before an arbitration board of three, a union
nominee, a company nominee, and an impartial chairman. By a two to
one decision the board held that the article in the collective agreement
bound management to continue its existing pension plan. On review
the judiciary had to decide whether the arbitration panel interpreted
or added to the substance of the collective agreement. For the Court
Mr. Justice Martland upheld the board's ruling:
When the [Company] agreed to continue its support of the
welfare plans in accordance with the terms of the present
agreements that commitment can certainly be construed as
an undertaking by it not to discontinue any of those plans, but
to maintain them as they then existed. Such an interpretation
of the article is, in my opinion, not only a proper one, but is
probably the right one. But whether right or wrong, in my
view the Board interpreted and did not amend the agreement.
10. Re: International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Flin Flon Lodge
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This being so, it did not exceed its jurisdiction and its award
is valid. ' 2
To the Supreme Court the proper exercise of jurisdiction by an
arbitration panel is not whether a correct decision is reached by the
arbitrators, but whether the board interpreted or added to the
substance of the agreement. Within these boundaries there is nothing
to prevent the development of an industrial common law; of one
arbitrator citing and accepting the reasoning of another arbitrator in
the interpretation of language. Of course, it must be recognized that
the language of collective agreements necessitates an understanding
of industry custom. For Hudson Bay the process of arbitration resulted
in an initially gratuitous plan being converted into something in the
nature of an employee's right. The fact that it was a pension rather than
a profit sharing plan made no difference. The same rationale would
apply.
In another decision coming seven years before Hudson Bay the
Supreme Court further indicated the function of arbitration and the
prerogative of management. Canada Car & Foundry Co., Ltd.,
operating in Quebec, had unilaterally instituted a retirement plan
before the first collective agreement. Under the terms of that plan,
voluntary as to employee participation, compulsory retirement at 65
was ordered. To what extent may a pension or profit-sharing program
contain compulsory retirement provisos and not strike at what many
regard as key features of any collective agreement, namely, seniority
rights, and the requirement that any discharge must be for just cause?
The Court stated:
The determination of a mandatory retirement age, applicable
to all employees, is clearly a function of management. While it
may well be that the age at which such compulsory retire-
ment should become effective could be made the subject of
collective agreement, the agreement under consideration here
does not touch upon it. . . . In my opinion, compulsory
retirement at age 65 is not a violation of the clauses in the
collective agreement respecting seniority rights.... 13
The Court enunciated a doctrine of residual management rights
which arbitrators were to read into agreements. These were
prerogatives that a company could negotiate away. Yet failing any
specific agreement proviso, those residual rights of management are to
12. Id. 4-5 (emphasis added).
13. Canada Car & Foundry Co., Ltd. v. Dinham, [1960] S.C.R. 3, 21 D. L.R. 2d 273 (1960).
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stand.' 4 Recognizing the industrial facts of life, what are arbitrators
to do? Said one arbitration chairman in a decision which evoked
separate opinions from both the company and union nominee:
To the average employee the terms of his employment are
contained in the collective agreement. When a retirement
plan is created unilaterally by the company, without
consultation with his authorized bargaining agent, the union,
and it permits him to use discretion whether or not he should
participate, it is understandable he should consider that the
terms of the collective agreement referring to his accrued
seniority, which ostensibly assured him continued employ-
ment or work available that he is able to perform, would
govern his term of employment until such time as the com-
pany finds cause for his discharge.
This underlines, in the opinion of the chairman, the
necessity for the company creating a general policy of
retirement, separate and apart from the contents of a plan
applicable only to those who participate in it. '-
The chairman in the arbitration felt compelled in the face of court
rulings to permit the company to carry forward a program of
compulsory retirement insofar as there was adequate notice. This was
assumed for those who participated in the voluntary retirement plan;
it was not for those who elected to stay outside that plan. While
concurring in the chairman's result the union nominee rejected his
rationale. Referring to the Canada Car decision of the Supreme Court
the union nominee stated:
With deference, I find that the comments of the court about
compulsory retirement are tantamount to an obliteration of
the collective agreement. Take, for example, the seniority
provisions. These provisions grant a priority of certain
available work to certain people. The retirement plan then
14. Re: Sandwich, Windsor and Amherstburg Railway Co., 26 D.L.R. 2d 704, 705
(Ont. Ct. App. 1960). For the Court, Aylesworth, J., said:
Spence, J., [for the lower court], accepts the principle that retirement of
employees at any particular age is a function of management and that the
question therefore is whether or not that function of management is in any way
cut down or taken away from the employer by reason of the provisions of the
collective agreement. We all, I think, are in full agreement with that statement
of principle by Spence, J. I think we all certainly are also in agreement that the
collective agreement does not prohibit in precise terms that which was done by
the company.
15. Re: International Chemical Workers, Local 174, & Dominion Tar & Chemical Co.,
Ltd., 10 Lab. Arb. Cas. 331, 336 (Can. 1960).
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comes along and removes this priority by removing the
people. The agreement says that certain employees may do X
and Y. The retirement plan says that if they are of a certain
age they may not do X and Y. To follow the Canada Car
dictum is to support the legal mutilation of collective
agreements. Therefore I would approach the grievance of
Kemp free from this judicial encumbrance.
It is my view that Dominion Tar has no right to perpetuate
a mandatory retirement policy in the wake of the discharge
provisions of its collective agreement with local 174. In so
saying I realize that I fly in the face of much Ontario
arbitration authority. With respect to the eminent
arbitrators; I see no distinction between forced "retirement"
and "discharge" as the term "discharge" is used in collective
agreements.
We must construe the word in the light of its obvious
purpose. Collective agreements are designed to provide
employees with job security. There are two ways that
security may be impaired. One way is through temporary
termination of employment, and the other way is through
permanent termination of employment. Temporary termination
is dealt with in the lay-off clauses, and in my view per-
manent termination is dealt with in the discharge clauses.
Some arbitrators have argued that to be discharged is to be
"fired." Retirement must therefore mean something else.
With respect, there is no reason to assume that the parties
intended to distinguish the methods by which employment
might be terminated. Surely they were concerned only with
the fact of termination. Whether the employer ended the
relationship with a smile or with a growl would be of little
consequence. The concern of the parties was to protect
against the arbitrary severance of the employment
relationship. Thus I submit that any management scheme
which permanently terminates employment must be governed
by the discharge provisions. This obviously includes
retirement plans. 6
The union dissent in part, well reasoned though it may have been,
flew in the face of firm judicial opinion which arbitrators were not free
to disregard in the development of their own common law for
16. Id. 341.
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industry.' 7 Nor, in this regard, has weight been given to American
rulings, "however persuasive." Said Arbitrator Wilson in 1961:
Even if it were conceded that the right of dismissal without
cause, on proper notice, had been surrendered . . . , the
[court] decisions I have quoted make it clear that dismissal
on account of age is dismissal for a cause which can
unilaterally be established by the employer.'
By judicial decision the union's sphere of interest in profit and
pension plans has been limited. Even those vital areas of seniority and
discharge for cause, key to effective union representation, may be
touched upon in the exercise of management prerogative related to
welfare programs. The burden is placed on the union to delineate
clearly the expressed limitations on management's administration of a
pension or profit sharing program.' 9 That burden is not easy to carry.
Consider the 1969 report of the Board of Conciliation in the dispute
between the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and the Association
of Radio and Television Employees of Canada (ARTEC)21 " A point at
issue was the unions's desire to share in the administration of the
company pension plan. This was rejected in part by the company on
the ground that ARTEC was only one of several unions whose
17. Of the existing law Professor Weiler wrote:
At present, both arbitral and judicial doctrine in Ontario accept, with some
limited reservations, the reserved rights theory as justifying management
prerogative to change, unilaterally, working conditions for business reasons.
This principle was originally worked out and established in the context of
subcontracting cases. Here the basic philosophical assumptions have been
developed concerning the approach to arbitral reasoning and decision making.
Unfortunately the lines that were drawn seemed to identify a legalistic, literal
interpretation of the agreement with arbitral restraint on the subcontracting
issue and opposed this combination to one of active, arbitral policy making
about management initiatives together with a creative interpretation of the
provisions of the agreement in the light of their collective bargaining
background. It is the thesis of this paper that there is no necessary identity of
position on these two issues, that it is inconsistent with the proper role of the
arbitrator for him to pick and choose among the various unilateral rights left to
management, but that adherence by the arbitrator to the rule of law
established by the agreement is quite compatible with a creative elaboration of
the structure of relations established by the parties.
Supra, note 8 at 6.
18. Re: Int'l. Woodworkers, Local 1-71, & Canadian Forest Products Ltd., 12 Lab. Arb.
Cas. 25, 28 (Can. 1961).
19. See Re: United Automobile Workers, Local 1075 & Canadian Car & Foundry Co.,
Ltd., 6 Lab. Arb. Cas. 161, 169 (Can. 1955).
20. In the Matter of a Dispute between Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and
Association of Radio and Television Employees of Canada, (Dean H.W. Arthurs,
Chairman) Feb. 25, 1969 (unpublished).
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members contributed to the plan. In its award the Board of
Conciliation found no merit to the company position:
[I]n terms of unilateral corporate control of these
welfare items there is no legal or moral reason why the
Corporation cannot and should not enter into a consensual
arrangement with ARTEC for the financing and governance
of these plans. Such consensual arrangements are the rule
rather than the exception in industry. Moreover to refuse
to share the administration of any of these plans with
ARTEC is indefensible at a time when they are financed, al-
most entirely by employee contributions.
The Corporation indicated its willingness to establish a
broadly based consultative committee, which would include
representatives of ARTEC and of other groups covered by
these welfare plans. However, in the course of exploring the
possible activities of such a committee; this Board became
impressed with the absolute necessity of according it much
broader powers amd fuller access to administration than
appeared to be contemplated by the Corporation. In our view,
any form of meaningful consultation on welfare is impossible
so long as significant information relating to the
administration of any of the plans is withheld from the
committee. We mention here; by way of example; the
necessity of full disclosure of the investments of the pension
plan; the profit from which is obviously material to the
financial stability of the plan. But we pass beyond the
question of full disclosure to the issue of full participation in
administration.
We recommend that the Corporation establish a
consulative committee on welfare, the members of which will
be designated by all of the unions with which the Corporation
enjoys a collective bargaining relationship and to which the
Corporation as well may name members. This committee
should be given full access to all information which it
requests, and it should prepare a scheme for the
administration of all welfare plans coverning Corporation
employees, whether on a Corporation wide or group-by-group
basis. To assist it in preparing such a scheme, any
information requested by the committee should be made
freely available to it.2'
21. Id. 16-19.
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Despite the award of the Board of Conciliation, as the negotiations
came to a conclusion, ARTEC did not choose to follow the opportunity
made available. The CBC remained in charge of the administration
and direction of the welfare plans which were funded primarily by
employees. Evidently, the issues of primary concern to the union were
direct wages and conditions of employment; it was willing to put
welfare plans in a secondary or fringe benefit category. Thus, in the
formulation of retirement or ancillary benefit schemes management
may, and often does, find itself in the position of defining the contours
of those programs within the context of labor laws. 22
22. THE FEDERAL TASK FORCE ON LABOUR RELATIONS found collective bargaining
concerned with fringe benefits because of their significance. At the same time, the report
questioned the effectiveness of that process in the resolution of problems. Supra note 5.
Originally collective bargaining dealt only with a limited range of
substantive issues. It was exceptional for unions and management to negotiate
anything beyond wages and hours and a few basic working conditions. In the
face of a threatened or actual test of economic strength, it was a matter of
accommodating the positions of the two parties on a few relatively straight-
forward issues.
Over the years an increasingly complicated range of issues has found its way
onto the bargaining table. The introduction of elaborate fringe benefit
schemes, especially in the health, welfare and pension fields, and intricate job
and income security arrangements, have forced the parties into more
sophisticated relationships requiring something beyond crisis bargaining.
It is important to understand why these have become bargainable issues- as
well as to appreciate the strengths and limitations that are inherent in such an
approach to the problem. To a large extent, both fringe benefits and job and
income security arrangements have been demanded by unions because of
public policies that they believe to be inadequate. Because governments on this
side of the Atlantic, unlike their counterparts in Europe, have been less
inclined to develop public social security schemes, groups of North American
workers were driven to demand, through their unions, their own little islands
of private social security. As a result, so-called fringe benefits in many cases
now add up to over 25 per cent of payroll costs. Similarly, because Canada has
only recently begun to develop a comprehensive manpower training income
maintenance, and relocation scheme, labour has had to strive for various forms
of job and income protection through collective bargaining.
Later in this Report we appraise the results of these efforts in more detail.
We conclude that while there are some advantages, especially in terms of
flexibility, in attempting to deal with such issues through collective
bargaining, there are also some distinct disadvantages. In the field of fringe
benefits, for example, the result has been a proliferation of private plans with
varying standards in terms of the levels of benefits, the degree of vesting and
funding, and the availability of economies of scale. Against the adaptability
characteristic of the present approach must also be recorded their uneven
incidence and their relatively small and uneconomic base of operations.
Collective bargaining has a role to play in this area, but not an exclusive one.
Equally questionable is the heavy onus placed on collective bargaining in
relation to adjustments made necessary by technological and other change.
Again, as our later appraisal shows, collective bargaining has made and
[Vol. 6:1
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Faced with de facto capacity to initiate retirement and pension
plans, what has management done? According to a statement of the
Department of National Revenue in 1967, emphasis seems to have been
placed on pension rather than profit sharing plans. Said the
Department, ". . . [T]here does not appear to be a large number of
Employee Profit Sharing Plans in existence in Canada, at least in
comparison with the number of pension plans. However, we do not
have a complete picture . . . "23 A Bell Canada Pension Fund Study
conducted during the same year among seventeen Canadian companies
found it desirable to have senior company management participate in
the investment of pension funds to the extent that they establish the
broad policy within which fund investments are made. In the minority
of cases covered by the Canada Bell Study.
. . . there is an expressed desire for companies to divorce
themselves as much as possible from the operation of the
fund, either because they want no responsibility for the
management of employee contributions (because they do not
want to risk criticism by unions or others), or merely because
they do not feel they have the necessary expertise to perform
such a function. The majority of companies feel however,
either that the size of their contributions to the fund does have
enough of an impact on company operations that they should
at least retain policymaking control over the investment
management of the fund, or that they have enough investment
expertise in their own organization to properly guide its
course.
24
Although there is the close relationship among pension funding,
labor ideals and goals, and presumably labor law, has primary control
over pension funds been found in the "labor jurisprudence?" The
fact is that such is not the case in Canada. While it might have been
expected that a major aspect of the legal control over pension funds
doubtless will continue to make a major contribution to solutions to problems
of change. But it has distinct shortcomings growing out of its limited coverage
of the labour force, the varying incidence of technological change provisions,
and the uneconomic and inequitable nature of many of these provisions.
Especially where displacement is involved, the appropriateness of relying on
collective bargaining to cope with the resulting socila consequences must be
called into question.
Id. 93-94.
23. B. Metzger, Investment Practices, Performance and Management of Profit
Sharing Trust Funds: A Study in Depth of Actual Holdings and Results With Certain
Comparative Pension Data, Profit Sharing Research Foundation 100 (1969).
24. Bell Canada Pension Fund Study 9 (1967).
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comes from "labor law," there is an absence of regulation from that
area. Regulation, as such, has taken a different form. Thus a
discussion of that regulation, independent of the substantive labor
law, is required.
3. LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTIONS
Pensions and pension funds are not the same. There is a distinction
between controlling pensions, which might be an aspect of social
welfare legislation, and regulating pension funds in an effort to
direct them as finaiwial institutions. This distinction, the line of
separation between the institution and its product can be vital to a
proper constitutional analysis to ascertain the proper roles for the
federal and provincial governments.
The legislative authority over pension funds as an industry rests
primarily in the provinces under The British North America Act. '
Like "insurance," there is no specific section in the B.N.A. Act
referring to pension funds, as such.26  As a result, the legal
interpretation given in the "insurance cases" may be helpful in
projecting a constitutional position. The cases arose under the federal
government's trade and commerce power:
Insurance cases were the medium for initial exposition of
the federal trade and commerce power. There is a singular
dearth of definition of "trade" or "commerce" in the privy
council's decisions, perhaps because that tribunal assumed or
came to a considered conclusion that the problem in the area
lay not so much in the words used to define the power granted
but rather the feasibility of local or national control of
economic activities which belonged as much to the provinces
under §§ 92(13, 16) of the B.N.A. Act as to the Dominion
under § 91(2).27
Lord Haldane in Attorney General for Canada n. Attorney Geteral
for Alberta, viewing sections of the Canadian Insurance Act, 1910,21
stated, "It must now be taken that the authority to legislate for the
regulation of trade and commerce does not extend to the regulation by
a licensing system of a particular trade in which Canadians would
25. See The British North America Act, 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3, particularly §4 92(13),
92(16) (1868).
26. This may be contrasted to the banking industry which was specifically mentioned
in the B.N.A. Act. See § 91(15), as a federal jurisdiction.
27. B. LASKIN, CANADIAN CONSTITUTMONAL LAw 417 (3d ed. 1966).
28. 48 S.C.R. 260 (S. Ct. Can. 1913); Judicial Committee of Privy Council 1 A.C. 588
(1916).
[Vol. 6:1
PROFIT SHARING AND PENSION PLANS IN CANADA
otherwise be free to engage in the provinces." 29 Thus, if pension funds
are viewed at one level as an industry then legislative jurisdiction
would reside in the provinces, for under the B.N.A. Act the industry
would be a particular trade falling under the.heading of "Property and
Civil Rights. '3 However, this position must be tempered against the
history of pension fund legislation.3 ' There was a constitutional
amendment with particular reference to pensions.3 2 In 1965, § 94A of
the B.N.A. Act was passed by the Federal Parliament that sub-
sequently received provincial assent. It provides: "The Parliament
of Canada may make laws in relation to old age pensions and
supplementary benefits, including survivors and disability benefits
irrespective of age, but no such law shall affect the operation of any
law present or future of a provincial legislature in relation to any such
matters.
33
Briefly, this amendment was the result of continued negotiation in
which nine of the provinces (excluding Quebec) delegated one aspect
of their acknowledged legislative authority over pension funds to the
federal government.3' Behind the provincial delegation and later
amendment of the B.N.A. Act were two factors: (1) The provinces
generally accepted the proposition that the federal government had
authority to promulgate social welfare legislation. (2) The then
proposed Canada Pension Plan would require considerable funding.3 5
The B.N.A. amendment brought a further realistic mix of juris-
diction. Primary authority over pension funds continued in the prov-
inces under the category, "property and civil rights." Yet, through
constitutional change which in effect recognized federal activity
relating to pensions and their administration, this theoretical pri-
mary control by the provinces may have realistically shifted for some
purposes to Ottawa.
4. HISTORY OF FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE PARTICIPATION
In 1908, the federal government enacted the Government Annuities
29. Id. 596.
30. Note 25 supra § 92(13).
31. Particular reference meant to legislation passed where the primary intention is
another social area, i.e. Income Tax, but incidental reference and effect to another area,
i.e. Pension Funds.
32. This amendment refers only to the Federal Pension Plan as established; the
amendment does not extend to constitutional authority with reference to private plans.
33. British North America Act, STAT. CAN. 1964-65, 13-14 Eliz. II, c. 73 (1964).
34. The exact details of such a scheme of delegation may be found in analysis of Mr.
Justice Laskin in CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 27 at 39-41.
35. See note 73 infra. There is a comprehensive, compulsory contribution, federally
operated pension plan independent of other possible private arrangements.
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Act,3 6 under which it sold annuities to residents of Canada to
encourage thrift and provide security for the eldeily.37 For some time
these annuities were a popular funding medium for small employee
pension plans;38  premiums were low, thus inhibiting competition
from other financial institutions; the program was subsidized to the
extent that the full cost of administration was met by appropriations
from Parliament. 39 Perhaps reflecting shifting goals, the program
implementation was first assigned to the Department of Trade and
Commerce for four years; then the Post Office until 1922; and finally,
the Department of Labour.4 0
The initial limit on the purchase of annuities was $600 per year.4
This was eventually raised to $5,000 per year in 1920.42 While the
variance is striking, for the most part the annual purchase limit has
been $1,200 per year.43 In 1948, however, the conditions of purchase
were modified; 44  the costs were revised to accommodate changed
interest rates and mortality tables. The result was that annuities
ceased to be cheaper than those provided by insurance companies.4"
This factor, and the growing disenchantment of the government with
the accumulating debt of offering the program over the years, led to
the recommendation in 1962 by the Royal Commission on Government
Organization that government annuities be discontinued.6 Receipts
under the program simply did not meet liabilities. 7 More important,
those intended to be benefited by the opportunity were not taking
advantage of the program. The Commission stated:
36. STAT. CAN. 7-8 Edw. VII, c. 5 (1907-08).
37. Id., preamble:
Whereas it is in the public interest that habits of thrift be promoted and that
the people of Canada be encouraged and aided thereto so that provision may be
made for old age; and whereas it is expedient that further facilities be afforded
for the attainment of the said objects: therefore His Majesty, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enacts as
follows:....
38. Understandably, the costs and ease of operation induced smaller plans to take
advantage of whatever economies of scale could be provided by the federal act.
39. Note 36 supra, § 11.
40. Id. § 3; The subsequent amendments stipulated changed administration.
41. Id. § s.
42. An Act to amend The Government Annuities Act, 1908, STAT. CAN. 10-11 Geo. V., c.
12, § 2 (1919-20).
43. The purchase limit of $1200 existed for 38 years.
44. CAN. REv. STAT., c. 132, § 5 (1952).
45. Insurance Companies licensed to issue annuities under § 26 REV. STAT. ONT., C. 341
(1950).
46. Queen's Printer, Ottawa, Vol. 3, at 288 (1962).
47. Id. 286-7.
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More annuities have been purchased by people of some
means than by those in the lower income brackets for whom
the scheme was designed. The original need has been
modified by old age pensions, now paid on a universal basis.
In comparison with the position in 1903, when few facilities
were available to provide for pensions and annuities, the field
today is highly developed. Through employer-employee
supported pension plans, life insurance schemes, and the sale
of annuities in a variety of forms by financial institutions,
ample facilities exist to provide against want in old age.
Apart from a periodic attractiveness when premiums are
allowed to get out of line, some inflexible aspects of
government annuities contracts make them less popular than
competing forms. It is not unfair to suggest that the only
circumstances in which they will be sold in volume is when
they are priced below the current market; thus the cost of
making good future deficiencies will be substantial indeed.
The essential responsibilities of the government are many,
and unnecessary activity should therefore be avoided.
Moreover, the programme has been very costly to the
government because:
-premiums have not- been set so as to cover
administrative costs.
-the interest rates used have been fairly consistently
out of line with the money market, thereby often
giving the purchaser a definite advantage.
-the mortality basis used has not been promptly
adjusted to reflect increasing longevity, so that
premiums have been lower than appropriate.
-the provision for deferred payment with an option
permitting purchasers, at negligible expense, to
commit the government to very costly undertakings.
Your commissioners conclude that the programme is no
longer necessary and that the continuing drain on public
funds should be arrested.4 8
In 1967, this government annuity program was terminated.4 9
Without going into the substantive aspects of the original government
plan, nor commenting upon the merits of such a policy, some
observations are in order.
48. Id. 287-8.
49. Pursuant to recommendations as mentioned.
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Pension funding is primarily a provincial matter. However, from the
beginning the federal government has been concerned and active in
the pension field. As early as 1908 the federal government provided a
pension plan. In the administration of that plan for nearly sixty years
the government stood as an active competitor to other financial
institutions. The 1908 act was not the end, but only the beginning of
federal involvement in pensions. From that starting point it became
clear that the federal government intended to be a participant in the
area notwithstanding the constitutional implications.
In this regard the federal government , asserted jurisdiction;
however, it did not do this by way of regulation. Instead, the
government, establishing its own national business enterprise, took
jurisdiction unto itself. The power of the provinces was not directly
challenged, but the federal role was unambiguous.5'
5. CURRENT FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE PARTICIPATION
Current federal pension participation is expressed in two legislative
schemes, the Old Age Security Act and the Canada Pension Plan.-,
However, it should be understood that this is not the full scope of
federal intervention; this is merely the first "half" of federal presence.
a) The Old Age Security Act s3
From 1927 to 1952, legislation provided for federal sharing in
assistance granted by provincial governments to those meeting stated
age, residence, and citizenship requirements.54 Pursuant to a "means
test" federal participation was in the form of helping to provide
subsistence level for the aged.55
In 1951, this federal participation was formalized with the omission
of the "means test" and the enactment of the Old Age Security Act and
the Old Age Assistance Act, effective in 1952.56 For the elderly, those
aged 70 and over, the new laws brought an initial benefit of $40 per
50. Though the B.N.A. Act seemed to provide otherwise, the first statute concerning
pensions was of federal origin.
51. The current federal role is somewhat different, but its nature is the "indirect
approach" as typified by the early act.
52. See notes 53, 68 infra; STAT. CAN. 1964-65, 13-14 Eliz. II, c. 51.
53. STAT. CAN. 1951 (2d Sess.), 15-16 Geo. VI, parts 1-11, c. 18.
54. These "tests may be found in An Act Respecting Old Age Pensions, STAT. CAN.
1926-27, 17 Geo. V, parts 1-11, c. 35, § 8.
55. The benefits were available to the "needy" over the age of 70, and by 1950, helped
over 40% of such Canadians.
56. Note 53 supra; STAT. CAN., 1950-51, 14 & 15 Geo. VI, 15 Geo. VI, 1; c. 55. The means test
was omitted pursuant to definitions of § 7 of latter Act.
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month.57 Yet, neither of the two laws was intended as a complete
pension, but instead formed what might be described as a subsistence
supplement. There was no direct relation to the cost of living or the
amount actually needed for survival at the time the statutes were
passed. 58
Today, under the Old Age Security Act, there is no "means test." All
those who have lived in Canada for ten years, and are 65 years of age
and older, qualify to receive payment under the statute. Regardless of
other source income, qualifying individuals are entitled to a flat rate of
$75 per month.5 9 This is intended to fluctuate according to the index
provided in the Canada Pension Plan, so that in fact, 1970 payments
are $79.80.60 Any payments received under this Act are independent of
benefits received under any other law.6 1
Another important aspect of the Old Age Security Act is an
amendment that was passed in 1966,62 which provides for a
guaranteed income supplement administered pursuant to a "means
test. ''63 As mentioned, the recipient is entitled to $75 per month
regardless of other source income. However, if the total of other source
income and payments under the Old Age Security Act does not total
$105 per month, the recipient may apply for additional benefits to bring
him to that level. 64 This supplemental provision is also adjusted under
the index of the Canada Pension Plan, so that the 1970 maximum
receivable is $111.41.65
Government assistance is paid directly from the Federal
government's revenue accounts. Revenues from this general account
form part of the broader Canada Assistance Plan that unifies old age
assistance, assistance to disabled, and certain aspects of the
unemployment compensation programs. 66 The latter aspects of the
Canada Assistance Plan are in cooperation with provincial
authorities. 67
57. Id. § 3.
58. Clearly, a flat rate of $40 bore no relation to the cost of living at that time for
one month.
59. An Act to Amend the Old Age Security Act, STAT. CAN. 1963, 12 Eliz. II, vol. 1, c.
16, § 1; see also Amendments to Old Age Security Act,.STAT. CAN. 1964-1965,-13-14 Eliz.
II, c. 51, §§ 120, 3A(1).
60. Amendments to Old Age Security Act, STAT. CAN. 1964-1965, 13-14 Eliz. II, c. 51, §§
120, 3A(2).
61. Id.
62. STAT. CAN. 1966-67, 14-15 Eliz. II, c. 65, § 3.
63. Id. §§ 3,7(2).
64. Id. §§3,8.
65. Id. §§3,9.
66. STAT. CAN. 1966-67, 14-15 Eliz. II, c. 45.
67. Id. § 4.
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The actual mechanics for the receipt of old age security benefits are
not of direct concern at this time. However, it is again important to
note the nature of the federal government's role in this matter.
Historically, the government was in fact a competitor with pension
supplying institutions in the sale of annuities. However, participation
under the Old Age Security Act is of a different nature. The
government is the supplier of a subsistence type of pension without
formal contribution under these acts, thereby setting a somewhat
different base for the operation of pension institutions.
b) Canada Pension Plan68
The federal government enacted the Canada Pension Plan in 1965 in
part under the authority of the then new constitutional amendment to
the B.N.A. Act, Section 94A. After discussion and nlegotiation nine
provinces delegated certain aspects of their jurisdiction so that the
plan could be passed. 69 The Quebec exception will be discussed more
completely under the later heading "Other Provincial Regulation";
the Canada Pension Plan for the other provinces has been in force
since January 1, 1966.70
The Canada Pension Plan can be briefly described as an extension of
the social insurance program of the Old Age Security Act. Currently,
it applies to approximately 92% of the Canadian labor force, but its
coverage extends to self-employed persons as well as employees. 7 ' The
plan is considerably more comprehensive than merely providing
pension benefits to the defined contributors; it extends to relief for the
disabled and their dependents, benefits for survivors, disabled
survivors, and orphans of defined contributors. 7 2
Premier Robarts of Ontario discussed the significance of the Plan
and his province's position:
Since the right to do this [enact pension fund legislation]
clearly extends to each province of Canada, Ontario must
choose between two options. It must either operate its own
"comparable" plan, or it must participate in the Canada
Pension Plan.
Some broad and important changes have been made in the
various versions of the Plan put forward by the Federal
government over the period of the last year and a half....
68. STAT. CAN. 1964-65, 13-14 Eliz. II, c. 51.
69. Note 34 supra.
70. Id. § 125.
71. Id. § 10.
72. Id. § 43.
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In this context, I have come to the conclusion that bearing
in mind the safeguards which have been put in the legislation,
it would be in the best interests of the people of Ontario and in
the best interests of Canada that we in Ontario accept the
Canada Pension Plan in principle and lend every effort to
make this plan truly national in scope for the benefit of all the
citizens of Canada....
As a result, we shall achieve uniformity of contributions
and benefits, and portability from coast to coast which has
been our aim since the beginning of our study in the field of
pensions.73
As a result, Ontario made extensive changes to its own proposed
legislation in the pension field.74 The provinces generally, bowed to
the uniform nature and comprehensive aspects of the broad federal
plan.7 .'
Benefits under the plan are related to earnings, and contributions.
There is a provision to escalate benefits similar to that as discussed
under the Old Age Security Act.7 6 Contributions are payable directly
from the employee's earnings at the rate of 1.8% of gross income
beginning at $600, not to exceed deductions for income over $5,300. 7
Contributions are taken from the employees' earnings by the
employer; they are exempt from income tax and are forwarded directly
to the federal government.78 Self-employed persons earning over $800
a year pay 3.6% of earnings over $600 to a maximum of $5,300. These
sums, too, are forwarded directly to the federal government.79
Pensions, as of 1970, are payable at age 65.80 The retirement pension is
25% of a contributor's average pensionable earnings, 8' which include
the $600 exempt from contributions to the maximum of $5,300, and are
calculated from age 18 or from the commencement of the program,
whichever had been first.8 2 There is no averaging over a period of less
than 120 months, with the result that for the first ten years of the
program, only partial pensions will be payable.8 3 The total result will
be that from 1976, full pensions should be payable.8 4
73. Legislature of Ontario Debates No. 2, Jan. 21, 1965, at 23-25 (The Queen's Printer,
Toronto 1965).
74. § 6(a) of this study. "The Pension Benefits Act," infra at 34.
75. § 8 of this study, "Other Provincial Regulation," infra at 47.
76. Note 68 supra, § 20.
77. Id. § § 14-17.
78. Id. § 22.
79. Id. § 34.
80. Id. § 44.
81. Id. § 46.
82. Id. § 49.
83. Id. § 47.
84. Note 34 supro, using the "effective date" of Jan. 1, 1966.
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As previously stated, disability pensions are provided, as well as for
those of survivors of contributors. For our purpose it is enough to state
that such provisions are available under the act. s5 They might be
described as the insurance element to the plan, the lump sum
payments available and the disability aspect are not entirely related to
pensions by definition. 6
The full impact of the Canada Pension Plan, and more particularly
of the Plan coupled with the other federal assistance previously
mentioned, is difficult to gauge. There is not yet enough experience
under the Plan. However, this much does seem clear: The federal
government has changed its historical intention concerning pensions.
It is no longer a seller of annuities. There is no longer a voluntary
aspect to the federal government assistance; the "contributor" has no
choice but to participate in the Plan. The government has undertaken
to provide a subsistence level in its plans through the combination of
the Old Age Security Act and the Canada Pension Plan. A floor has
been set. Every aged or disabled citizen has a base level of income,
without direct reference to means and amounts channeled to the
voluntary purchase of annuities.
One real impact of this legislation is the role that the federal
government has created for other pension supplying institutions. A
"private" pension need no longer concern itself with the direct
problem of subsistence for its beneficiaries. In effect, private pension
plans have been relegated to a position of supplying supplemental
pension incomes. The result of such a role has not been control or
regulation by the federai government over private pension plans,
although none could dispute the substantive effects on the private
sector of public welfare law.
In terms of the private pension "trustees" roles, this has a marked
effect as well. Subsistence is no longer an issue. This severely alters
the nature of the trust or indenture that a pension fund management
group must undertake. The performance of the private pension
"trustee" can be gauged by different standards: A pension fund
trustee need not be solely concerned with security and preservation of
assets as he might be were he under the understanding that his
beneficiary had no other source of income.
Similarly, the contributor to a private pension plan may have
speculative objectives, for he need not be as concerned with his daily
needs of shelter, subsistence, and care. Government action, in sum,
may have freed the private sector to become performance oriented. By
85. Note 68 supra, §§ 54-58.
86. Pensions at retirement age will be measured in relation to contributions as against
individual circumstances of "tragedy."
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implication, therefore, the private sector can concern itself more fully
with responding to inflation, or more optimistically, a measure of
wealth in old age. Yet at this time, whatever federal law should allow,
there are warnings to be sounded. Provincial law did not auto-
matically free private pension funds to the winds of the market.
Provincial laws enacted at about the same time as the Canada
Pension Plan made definite provision that private pension plans could
not retroactively adjust their levels to take advantage of the Canada
Pension Plan benefits. 87 As an illustration, Ontario declared: "No
amendment of a pension plan consequent upon the coming into force of
the Canada Pension Plan shall adversely affect the pension benefit
credits of any member in respect of remuneration and service or
membership in the plan prior to the first day of January, 1966.88
The Ontario amendment, however, might only have been a step in a
transition. The former Chairman of the Pension Commission of
Ontario stated:
Following the introduction of the Canada Pension Plan and
the extension of Old Age Security, the popular idea of an
"appropriate" pension level has changed drastically. I
suggest that an appropriate pension should be distinguished
from a subsistence pension and from a pension that maintains
the same standard of living. An appropriate pension is
basically what society believes its senior members should get.
...Generally, this involves a double deck plan with one level
of benefits and contributions on earnings up to the Canada
Pension Plan ceiling and a higher level of benefits and
contributions over the ceiling. 89
6. PROVINCIAL REGULATION
The primary authority for the control of pension funds resides in the
Provinces. Federal participation is directed toward supplying a base
level of subsistence for the elderly. The following is a summary of
provincial regulation of "private" pension plans.90 The initial focus
will be on Ontario. The legislation of other provinces will be compared
in Section 7, infia. The analysis will concentrate on controls over
equity participation.
87. Note 88 infra,
88. Note 92, § 22 i?-fram
89. See The National Underwriter 38 (Oct. 8, 1966) (Paper presented to American
Pension Conference).
90. Again, excluded are those pension plans created pursuant to Special Act of either
Parliament.
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a) The Pension Benefits Act 91
The Pension Benefits Act of 1965 is the basis for existing Ontario
regulation over pension plans.9 2 However, during the period 1960-1965
studies were made and other legislation was attempted. It may be
useful to set forth the provincial attitude concerning pension funds
during this period.93
In 1960, the Ontario Committee on Portable Pensions was estab-
lished.9 4 Its inquiry was comprehensive, but its particular concern
was the portability of pension credits on a change in employment.
The Committee made two reports to the Ontario Government,
and proposed a draft bill.95
The first report of the Committee dealt with voluntary plans, present
or future. It rejected any compulsory state-operated pension pro-
gram.96 The Committee recommended:
a) The establishment of a vesting standard
b) restrictions on cash withdrawals of contributions
c) compulsory membership for new employees where there is an
initial plan established. 97
In making these recommendations, the Committee thrust was
portability of benefits and locking in of contributions made. The
recommendations were not nearly as comprehensive as the second
report which stated:
An arrangement for transferring pension accumulations
from one fund to another, or for consolidating a number of
separate pensions at the time of retirement, serves merely to
assemble what has already been acquired and cannot, of
itself, increase it. Indirectly, however, the result may be more
substantial since the convenience of transfer and
consolidation may serve to induce more retention of pension
savings, and where membership is voluntary, may encourage
non-members to join. Further, the aggregating of small
pension accumulations, by whatever method, should give the
91. This general expression refers to an Act to Provide for the Extension Improvement
and Solvency of Pension Plans and for the Portability of Pension Benefits, STAT. ONT.
1962-63, 11-12 Eliz. II, c. 103.
92. REv. STAT. ONT. 1965, 13-14 Eliz. II, c. 96.
93. Note 73 supra.
94. It consists of D. MacGregor and G.E. Gathercole, joint chairmen, R.M. Clark, C.
E. Hendry, R.E.G. Davis, and J.A. Tuck.
95. Bill No. 125.
96. A Summary Report of the Ontario Committee on Portable Pensions, 1961, at 5.
97. Id. 6-15.
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owner a more accurate idea of their value and perhaps a
greater sense of their importance.9 8
In this second report, the Committee reconsidered earlier
recommendations and focused on some additional areas of concern. It
reaffirmed the vesting proposals and the locking in of employee
contributions, but, in addition, urged that all employers with fifteen or
more employees be required to introduce pension plans without,
however, stating a period within which compliance would be
required.99
The Committee summarized several of the obstacles involved: How
were contributions to be valued on transfer? 100 What was to be done
if the transfer brought changed benefits? 101 Or changed security? 102
How were administrative costs to be measured? 103 How was uni-
form government supervision to be achieved? 104 Was there not the
inherent difficulty of blended jurisdiction? 105 Finally, were there not
very significant actuarial problems? 106
The Committee submitted a draft bill in 1961 and proposed
regulations that carried forward the concern of the bill with solvency
and control over investments. 07 These reports and the draft bill were
examined and discussed at the Interprovincial Conference of Premiers
in Charlottetown that year.'08 However, as the Committee worked on
revisions of its drafts later that year, the federal government
announced its intention to seek a constitutional amendment for the
establishment of a nationwide contributory pension plan. 0 9 While no
details were announced, it was understood that the federal govern-
ment would direct attention to the solvency and portability of existing
private pension plans." 0
Notwithstanding this statement of intention, the Committee's
proposal was introduced as Bill 165 in the Ontario legislature on April
6, 1962. Speaking of the Bill Premier Robarts stated:
98. The Second Report of the Ontario Committee on Portable Pensions, August 1961,
at 56.
99. Id. ch. 2.
100. Id. ch. 6.
101. Id.
102. Id. ch. 8.
103. Id. ch. 3.
104. Id. ch. 10.
105. Id. 92.
106. Id. ch. 11.
107. Globe & Mail, Aug. 17, 1961, (on microfilm-Retirement Pension No. 2, Frame
No. 16).
108. Globe & Mail, Aug. 19, 1961.
109. Globe & Mail, Dec. 7, 1961.
110. Globe & Mail, March 20, 1962.
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The Bill represents the Committee's agreed proposals for
improving the portability of pension benefits, for extending
coverage of pension plans, and for raising levels of solvency
where these are inadequate. Of necessity the Bill refers only
to measures which could be undertaken by a provincial
government, although the Committee hopes that the
improvement Of pension plans can be achieved on an inter-
provincial basis with the cooperation of the federal
government, in view of the importance of interprovincial
business. . . . I wish to emphasize that the Bill is intended at
this time only for study and discussion....
The Premier added:
The announcement by the federal government is couched in
such broad terms that it will leave a great deal of room for
negotiation and discussion. If the required constitutional
approval is not obtained by the federal government, it is,
nevertheless, possible that an act similar to the Pension
Benefits Act could be put into effect by a number of the larger
provinces. If, on the other hand, the federal government does
establish a nationwide wage related pension plan, with
approval of the provinces, there will still be a need ,fbr
regulating the portability, solvency, and other provisions q
the private pension plans that remain. Moreover, if a federal
government plan is enacted along the lines of the government
plan existing in Great Britain, legislation similar to the
Pension Benefits Act might serve as the standard under
which private pension plans would be allowed to "contract
out" of the government plan." ,2
The Pension Benefits Act in substantially the form as recommended,
was enacted in 1963.Y 3 To implement the legislation, the Act
established the Pension Commission of Ontario as a supervisory
body.1 1' 4 Most of the provisions in the Act were to be effective January
1, 1965, with the Commission, however, to begin its information
gathering and planning 1963.
In the spring of 1964 a federal-provincial conference of Premiers and
Prime Ministers was held in Quebec City followed by a series of
discussions regarding the introduction of the federal plan. The result
for Ontario was a basic amendment of Part I of the Pension Benefits
111. Legislature of Ontario Debates, Vol. 2, April 6, 1962 at 2020, 2021 (The Queen's
Printer, Toronto 1962).
112. Id. 2023 [emphasis added].
113. Note 91 supra.
114. Id. § 2.
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Act."- The amendment focused on the repeal of Section 17, requiring
every employer with fifteen or more employees to establish a pension
plan by 1965. The original vesting requirements were also altered
somewhat, making such standards less stringent. ' 6
The original Act, the amendment of 1964, and a draft Uniform
Pension Act were incorporated into the Pension Benefits Act in
1965." ' 7 The previous proposals, and a measure of co-operation with
other provincial regulation, is a primary objective of the Act. The
Pension Benoefits Act of 1965 concentrated on vesting, funding, and the
quality and diversification of investments. ' 8 There is no requirement
for the compulsory establishment of a plan. It is not retroactive, nor
does it require changes of benefits and contributions related to service
before January 1, 1965." 9 The Act was slightly broadened and tight-
ened by amendments in 1967, 1968, and 1969.120
For the purpose of this article answers to the following questions are
needed:
a) What plans are encompassed by the Act?
b) What are the specific controls affecting equity investments?
For purposes of the Act, a pension plan is "a superannuation or
pension fund or plan organized and administered to provide a pension
benefit for employees." 2 ' Included, by section 1(h) of the Act are
deferred profit sharing plans (other than those defined in sections 52
and 53 (a) of the Corporations Tax Act), thereby making the Act
applicable to deferred plans by way of pension, rather than merely
"cash" deferred profit sharing plans.' 22 The Act understandably
applies only to employees in Ontario,'23 not to those of the Federal
government or to individuals under its jurisdiction.' 24 The Act
excludes "employee pay-all plans" and union or fraternal programs
controlled by the relevant outside group,' 25 although it does apply to
pension plans of employees of labor organizations which make
115. REv. STAT. ONT. 1964, 12-13 Eliz. II, c. 88.
116. Id.
117. STAT. ONT. 1965, 13-14 Eliz. II, c. 96.
118. Id.
119. Id. §§ 21, 22.
120. STAT. ONT. 1967, 15-16 Eliz. II, c. 72; STAT. ONT. 1968, 17 Eliz. II, c. 93; STAT. ONT.
1968-69, 17-18 Eliz.II, c. 92.
121. Note 89 supra § 1(1) (h).
122. Id. § 1(1) (h) (iv).
123. Id. § 1(1) (i).
124. Id. § 1(2).
125. Id. § 1.
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contributions as an employer. 26 The Act, in sum, is concerned with
the usual pension in which the employer is a contributor.
The Act seeks to make pensions secure through vesting, portability,
and solvency requirements. Tied to solvency are the regulations of the
Act on permissible investments for a registered pension fund. The
statute itself through Section 25 does not lay down the allowable
classes of investments. Instead, it authorizes the implementing
administrative body through regulation to prescribe sanctioned
investments. 127
Those regulations have been promulgated. First, it is made clear
that the rules override any proviso in the plan. No agreement between
parties can mitigate the effect of the regulations defined in Section 14.
The quality of investments is keyed to those permitted under the
Canadian and British Insurance Companies Act. This incorporation
by reference in general places pension funds in the posture of security
of assets investment orientation. More particularly, however, it must
be emphasized that subject to minor quality restraints there is nothing
that would prevent a fund from investing all of its assets in common
stock. The funds are freed of the quantity restraints of the insurance
act; they are burdened only with the quality standards, which, in turn,
have only limited meaning. They require that a corporation have an
earnings record over a brief period capable of paying a low dividend.
Other provisos give pension funds an even greater degree of mobility
in their investment program. Thus, if a pension fund held securities
which are "altered" by a reorganization, liquidation, or amalga-
mation with another corporation so that the new "securities" would
not qualify as investments for a life insurance company it will not
bar the pension fund from holding the new instrument. The basic aim
of this section would appear to appreciate several of the realities of
corporate existence. Should a company be reorganized or taken
over, the pension fund is relieved from reclassifying its investments.
Presumably, if the initial investment passed the "test" of the
regulation, a reorganization or reclassification is not necessary.
Where, however, a pension fund chooses to invest in real estate or
mortgages it may find itself subject to somewhat tighter restraint than
life insurance companies which have a long history of real estate
involvement. For pension funds a "basket" clause also appears in the
regulations. A pension plan may invest or loan funds in areas not
otherwise allowed in real estate or leaseholds. However, such
investments must meet the following "tests:" a) they must be made in
Canada; b) they must be only for the production of income; and,
126. Id.
127. ONTARIO REGULATIONS 188/65.
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c) they must not exceed 1% of the book value of the total assets of the
fund. This is a rather interesting type of exclusion. That it can only be
made in Canada shows a decided policy preference for Canadian
investment; this is not a qualitative restriction as much as one with
nationalistic aims. Secondly, the exclusion applies only for the
production of income. Thus, an investment cannot be made with
speculative motives, nor with a view to providing capital rather than
income. Finally, the basket clause is related to fund assets. No controls
are exercised over actual dollar expenditures in any single project.
Hence, the restriction goes to undue concentration of fund assets.
However, it must be asked whether anything other than diversity of
investment is achieved through the qualification. 28
Another proviso of the pension fund regulations qualifies the real
estate restriction. It denies any interpretation that would amplify the
authority conferred by the Canadian and British Insurance Companies
Act (Canada) regarding investments in mortgages and real estate. 29
That Act permits a life company to place seven percent of its total
assets in random investment 30 with no single real estate investment
exceeding one percent of total assets.' 3' What pension funds are denied
is the right to establish or control real estate development com-
panies.'3 2 However, for the pension plan seeking an allowed real estate
investment the restrictions imposed are not severe. The legislation
purports to set down criteria for real estate investment, but they
cannot realistically be termed "stringent."'' 32 They are not unlike
those governing stock investments. Qualitatively they require only
that the investments be Canadian and income producing. Nothing is
laid down concerning rate of return. Further, should the fund accept
a loan instrument it may obtain additional security, such as stock or
warrants, as a condition to the loan or its repayment.
The pension regulations also deal with certain prohibited practices.
Section 14(5) strikes at conflicts of interest. It forbids loans to certain
classes of people and corporations in which the fund may operate. The
section appears to recognize the "trustee" nature of the funds. 33 If
the legislation generally is to preserve assets and protect contributors,
it is not surprising that an aspect of the control to bring such a state of
128. Considering the apparent fascination with urban real estate in Canada, the
amount spent within the one percent range can vary greatly during cyclical upswings in
the real estate market as seen in the past decade.
129. Ontario Regulation 103/66, §§ 14(2), (4), (6).
130. Stat. Can. 1964-65,13-14 Eliz. II, c. 40 § 5(8).
131. Id.
132. Id. Compare § 64 of the Canadian and British Insurance Companies Act with the
pension Fund Regulations.
133. The term "trustee" is used strictly in adjectival terms.
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affairs to reality, would be the prevention of investments that may be
influenced by related personalities or corporations. Similarly, it is
provided that all investments be made in the name of the fund, and not
its managers.
Subsection 6 of section 14 is a prohibition against a type of "undue"
concentration. No more than 10 percent of the book value of the fund
may be invested in any single venture or stock. No prohibition exists
against a fund using the 10 percent allowable in acquiring all of a
given issue. Unlike the rules governing, for example, the members of
the Canadian Mutual Funds Association, 34 pension funds are not
limited in the amount of any issue to be acquired. They are only
constrained by an assets test. So it is that a pension fund could be in a
position to obtain a control over a portfolio enterprise. The major
obstacle in doing this would be the need to buy only for income. 35
In making its investments the fund may either create its own
management company or contract for advice. The regulations
accordingly allow a fund to invest in:
a) a pooled, segregated mutual fund; or
b) the shares of a corporation
(1) whose assets are at least 98% cash, investments and loans,
(2) that does not issue debt obligations, and
(3) that obtains at least 98% of its income from investments
and loans.
The regulations provide, of course, that such controlled groups must
also be limited in investment powers to the same extent as pension
funds. Appropriate permission is granted to make these indirect
investments, exempt from the 10% of assets test. Briefly, should a
pension fund decide that it is served better by an outside "investing"
institution, the "turning over" of such funds is not restricted. 36
Several conclusions may be drawn from the provincial regulations.
Like insurance companies, the regulations purport to effect the quality
and diversification of investment portfolios. The incorporation by
reference of the quality provisions in the insurance act and the 10%
requirement would seem to summarize the government's concern with
investments.
However, there is one important exception that should be compared
to insurance regulation and repeated: There are no limits on the
proportion of the fund that may be invested in any form of equity,
134. Canadian Mutual Funds Association, Code of Ethics and Regulations.
135. By way of contrast, see The Bank Act of 1967, particularly § 76.
136. Envisaged is the service provided by a Trust Company, for example. It is difficult
to imagine too many companies with 98% of its assets in "cash, investments and loans,"
etc.
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including common stock.1 3 7 Clearly, diversification is assured by the
fact that no one investment may take up more than 10% of the pension
fund's assets. But this would not prevent a pension fund from
investing 100% of its assets in common stocks that meet the test of the
"insurance act" so long as each investment is within 10% of the fund
portfolio. The real question for consideration becomes, not whether
there should be such regulations, but why is there that which appears
to be a planned omission of further limits regarding such invest-
ment? 138
There is room for speculation. Admittedly, a pension fund has a low
requirement for liquidity; presumable, most liabilities can be covered
by current contributions. Perhaps also there is an underlying reality.
The law may by omission recognize a need for a pension fund to
concern itself with a hedge against inflation provided by equity
investments. After all, the federal programs, including the Canada
Pension Plan, meet basic or subsistence standards. Why not invest for
the future? Why not preserve the value of the dollar? There is,
however, a quite different possibility. There may be trust in the
existing solvency requirements. Should pension funds be invested in a
way that would jeopardize their solvency, the Pension Commission by
statute has the power to amend and tighten its regulations. As matters
now stand pension managers must be deemed to have discretion to
judge for themselves what is reasonable in terms of equity invest-
ments.
39
This collar of regulation may fit lightly, but it is there. Pension
plans do not exist of right. They are the object of interprovincial
registration.'40 There is provision for annual information returns.14 '
And, finally, where a pension plan is terminated, the employer is liable
to pay all amounts that would otherwise have been required to be paid
to meet the test for solvency prescribed by the regulations up to the
date of such termination. These amounts are payable to the insurer,
administrator, or trustee of the plan. In effect, the employer becomes a
guarantor of the benefits, prescribed by the provincial act, and also to
the extent that evasion might be attempted because of the Canada
137. For purposes of this paper, equity ownership in a broad sense is the scope of this
inquiry; there is no particular emphasis on "common stock" as the sole class of equity
investment to be discussed.
138. Why are pension funds receiving different treatment than Banks, Life Insurance
and Trust Companies?
139. With the exception of the "Canadian" requirement, there does not appear to be a
preference for any particular class of investment. There is a distinct difference between
these prohibitions and those of the Chartered Banks where investment restrictions were
related to a preference for liquid investments.
140. Note 91 supra, § 10(2).
141. Id. § 13(1).
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Pension Plan provisions. Behind these duties is the danger of criminal
sanctions for contravention of the Act which is administered by the
Pension Commission of Ontario.4 2
b) The Pension Benefits Standards Act '
To complete the pattern of pension regulation the federal
government has intervened in the enactment of the Pension Benefits
Standards Act of 1967. Its purpose is to cover those plans not
encompassed by provincial regulation, and falling under federal
authority. Examples of such industries are numerous. They include
broadcasting, banking, shipping and navigation, and railways.'
Federal law extends provincial protection to those groups outside
provincial control. 4 , The standards are generally consistent with
those prescribed in the Ontario legislation; their rationale can be
traced to federal government representation at the hearings conducted
by the Ontario Committee on Portable Pensions.
The Act is administered by the Superintendent of Insurance at
Ottawa and is under the central direction of the Minister of
Finance. 4 6 In summary form the Act provides:
a) a definition of those falling under federal jurisdiction.1 7
b) recognition that companies can be under both federal and
provincial authority. 4 8
c) cooperation as to agreement, registration, and inspection
with provincial authorities.'
d) audit, inspection, registration, solvency, comparable to
provincial legislation.150
e) criminal sanctions somewhat more stringent than those of
the province.' 5'
The legislation mirrors that of the provinces as to the practical
control of pension funds. For present purposes, it may be noted that
investment restrictions are identical and subject to the same
142. Id. § 10.
143. STAT. CAN. 1966-67, 14-15-16 Eliz. II, c. 92.
144. Individual Pension Plans for such employers may be found in particular Acts of
Parliament, i.e. RCMP plan, or they may be private plans set up by "federal"
companies.
145. Note 143 supra.
146. Note 144 supra, where Provincial Acts could not constitutionally control such
plans.
147. Note 143 supra.
148. Id. § 3.
149. Id. § 5.
150. Id. § 13.
151. d. §§ 16, 20.
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incorporation by reference to the Canadian and British Insurance
Companies Act. In fact, the major difference between the Ontario Act
and the Federal Act is the nature of the supervision to date. The
federal government has been intent in causing registered pension
plans to conform to the standards set in 1967. 152
7. THE INCOME TAX ACT 153
Indirectly, but significantly, the federal government has influenced
the structure and behavior of pension and profit sharing plans through
welfare legislation such as The Canada Pension Plan and the Old Age
Security Act, and especially the Income Tax Act.' 54 That Act allows
for the deduction of contributions to retirement plans for both the
employer and the employee. The effect on retirement schemes cannot
be overstated.
a) Pension Plans
Exclusion from income for tax purposes is the primary control
imposed by the revenue act. Contributions to a pension plan by an
employer are deductible from his income.' 5 During the contribution
period, the employee is not taxed on any payments made on his behalf
to qualifying pension funds by the employer.' '5 6 Contributions by an
employee are deductible from the employee's income. 15 7 Once these
amounts have reached the pension fund, and the monies are invested
so that no more than 10 percent of its income is derived from sources
outside Canada the fund itself pays no tax if it is registered.' 58 In
effect, the Act stimulates a measure of thrift on the part of the
employee; it proposes a deduction similar to charitable deductions for
the employer; and tax otherwise payable on these contributions is
deferred until it is received as a retirement benefit. Then it is taxed in
the hands of the employee.
Historically, the tax legislation has therefore been a direct control
over pension funds generally, and their structure in particular.
Previous to provincial control over vesting, categorization,
termination, funding, and investment, primary control over pension
152. See generally Reports' of Superintendent of Insurance re: Pension Plans,
available annually from Queen's Printer, Ottawa.
153. REV. STAT. CAN. (1952) c. 148.
154. Id. § 11(1) (X), (i).
155. Id. § 11(1) (g), (h); Regulations, part XXVII.
156. Id. § (1)(a).
157. Id. §§ 11(1) (i), (8), (12).
158. Id. § 62(I)(q), and Departmental Rules re: Pension Plan Registration, Oct. 1,
1968, Rule 6.
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funds was by way of registration and approval under the Income Tax
Act.
From the beginning, the Department of National Revenue sought to
use its tax power for broad control of pension plans. With the
corporation tax payable during and shortly after World War II,
business was able to pay substantial amounts to pension plans; these
monies would be more favorably treated than raising wages and
salaries, and, within such limits, the contributions were a matter of
indifference to the shareholders. 15 9 Once corporate tax rates settled,
the department shifted its interest to many of the social, legal and
actuarial problems of pension plans. 6 0  The ultimate position
appeared to be that the department was promoting legislation that
was more and more remotely connected to the collection of tax
revenues. In fact, the 1959 bulletin with reference to pension plans was
admittedly a considerable infringement on areas that had been
acknowledged as provincial jurisdiction.' 6' Spurred by criticism,
growing provincial interest in the general control of pension funds,
and increased problems with the policing of its bulletin, the
department shifted its emphasis from 1960.162 As a result, the thrust
of tax legislation appeared to shift from problems of vesting and
funding, to the problem of preventing illusory and tax avoidance
pension schemes.
Current administrative policy appears to have been stabilized in the
departmental rules with regard to the "acceptance" of pension plans
of October 1st, 1968.163 The Federal taxing authority fully recognizes
and broadens provincial control. Indeed, aid is extended in enforcing
provincial law. A new or amended pension plan must now receive
provincial registration before it can receive registration for federal tax
purposes. However, the mere provincial acceptance of a plan does not
assure tax acceptance unless additional criteria are met.
Aside from policing provisions, there are several non-investment
provisions that merit special attention. Employee contributions are
deductible up to a maximum of $1,500 in any single year.'64 An
employee may deduct up to $1,500 in any year as to past service if
159. Since deductions for pensions never "reach" the shareholder, it can be argued
that this is the same as higher taxes for the corporation, that also never "reach" the
shareholder.
160. See generally the emphasis with post-war departmental bulletins regarding
pension plans.
161. Extensions were attempted into problems of solvency, vesting, etc., which were
unrelated as such to tax.
162. The 1960 position, as refined, is the basis for current tax control.
163. "Departmental Rules in Regard to Acceptance of Employee Pension Plans for
Registration Pursuant to § 139 (ahh) of the Income Tax Act."
164. Note 153 supra, § 11(1)(i).
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during that period he was not a contributor to the plan.165 Also,
employees may deduct additional amounts for such services when they
were contributors so long as the maximum for any given past year is
$1,500.166 Contributions by an employer are quite similar and are
governed by section 11(1) (g) of the Income Tax Act. 67 Contributions
by an employer for past service are governed by section 76.168
However, an employer is limited to the extent that current and past
payments must be "reasonable in the circumstances" as stated in
section 12(2) of the Act.' 69 The objective standards are defined in
departmental guidelines. 7 0
Calculation under the above rules makes the maximum pension
payable $40,000 per year.'7 ' However, this need not account for any
dividends that might have permitted the purchase of additional
pension benefits.'7
2
For equity investment purposes, the major control through the
Income Tax Act is the requirement that the income from the pension
fund investments must be primarily Canadian. 173 The fact that 90% of
income must be from Canadian sources to maintain registration has a
direct effect on the investment policy of a pension fund manager.'7 4
Presumably, registration under the Act is a prerequisite for the
existence of a plan. In terms of deductibility by both the employer and
employee, neither would likely contribute to a pension fund were he
required to pay tax on such contributions.
While not directly concerned with investments, the Act indirectly
affects investments in another important way. The Act makes specific
allowance for retirement savings plans and profit sharing plans as
well as direct reference to pension plans.'7 5  While registered
165. Id. § 1ll1)(i)(ii)A.
166. Id. § 11(1)(i)(i).
167. Employer may deduct such amount paid by him to or under a registered pension
fund or plan in respect of services rendered by employees in the taxation year (subject to
two express exceptions).
168. An employer, who has made a special payment on account of an employee's
pension plan and has made the payment so that it is irrevocably vested in the fund, may
deduct such special payment in computing his income.
169. Note 153 supra, § 12(2): "In computing income, no deduction shall be made in
respect of an outlay or expense otherwise deductible except to the extent that the outlay
or expense was reasonable in the circumstances."
170. Departmental Rules, re Pension Plan Registration, Oct. 1, 1968, note 163 supra.
171. Id. As set out in "The [Amended] Departmental Rules in regard to approvals
under Section 76 of the Income Tax Act, dated May 1, 1968."
172. Id. 6(1) taxes such income when actually received by taxpayer.
173. Note 158 supra.
174. Any foreign investment would be of a low yield, greater growth variety so that
"income" restrictions are not infringed.
175. Note 153 supra, § 79B(1).
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retirement savings plans are not a direct alternative to pension plans,
a profit sharing scheme might be.
b) Profit Sharing Plans
The Income Tax Act allows preferential treatment for monies
contributed to registered pension funds under the Income Tax Act.
However, the same favoritism is not necessarily afforded if the
employer creates certain types of profit sharing plans. There are
basically three varieties of profit sharing plans in Canada:
1. Profit Sharing Plans
2. Employees Profit Sharing Plans
3. Deferred Profit Sharing Plans
All involve the creation of trust funds.'7 6 The discussion to follow will
briefly trace the treatment of these plans, excluding, of course, cash
profit sharing arrangements which constitute current income.'77
Profit sharing pension plans as such are covered by the Pension
Benefits Standards Act, and can be registered with the Department of
National Revenue for tax purposes.'7 8  These plans are like
"standardized" pension plans in which a fixed percentage of employee
and employer income is contributed. In the profit sharing scheme, the
employer's contribution is related to profits rather than a fixed
average paid, but such a plan must include a minimum commitment by
the employer even in adverse years. For full benefit under the Act,
employees would take their distributions in the form of pension
benefits.
Under this scheme employee contributions are tax deductible just as
pension contributions under normal circumstances. However, there
are limits on the tax deductibility of employer contributions for
current services. 179
Employees' profit sharing plans in Canada are often treated as a
vehicle for thrift and savings.8 0 Under such plans, the employee
contributes a percentage of his earnings to a trust fund, but the
employer makes a contribution either related to the employee's
contribution or related to his profits, or a combination of both. The
employer's contribution is generally fixed as to its ultimate use;
however, the employee has the right to direct the investment of his
own monies.
Employee contributions are not tax deductible, but those of the
176. Id. § 79C(1).
177. Id.
178. Id. § 79C(2).
179. Id. § 79C(1).
180. Id.
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employer, being a fixed investment, are tax deductible without limit.
The employee, of course, has the option of directing his contribution to
a registered retirement savings plan thereby making it deductible.
However, this necessitates seeking a separate head of tax
deductibility. Furthermore, while payments out of a trust fund,
payable in any form, are not taxable in the hands of the employee, he is
required to pay tax each year on all amounts of his employer's
contribution allocated to his account, as well as any income that it
receives.' 8 ' Thus, a thrift and savings plan is difficult for the
employee; it has not been provided meaningful incentives under the
Income Tax Act.'82
A third type of profit sharing plan found in Canada is of the deferred
kind.' 83 It is non-contributory. It is entirely related to the employer's
profit. Under it employee contributions are similarly not tax
deductible unless directed to a registered retirement savings plan. The
amount of the employer's contribution, to be tax deductible, is limited
to $1,500 per employee each year with excesses payable to employees as
additional remuneration. The important element is that the em-
ployer's contribution is in no way related to that of the employees', if any.
Tax is not payable by employees until payment is actually received
from the fund. Similarly, investment income from the fund is not
taxable so long as it passes the "90% test" of income source.
To summarize, profit sharing plans under the Income Tax Act are
not treated with the same favor as pension plans. Indeed, deductibility
varies with how closely the profit sharing plan resembles a "classical"
pension fund. In any event, additional obstacles must be overcome for
deductibility to attach."8 4 It has been thought that, at times, a profit
sharing scheme, unlike a pension plan, can be used for tax avoidance.
This, in part, may account for some of the added strictures. 8 5 So it is
that the majority of retirement programs in Canada are in fact
"classical" pensions as opposed to profit sharing plans.186
8. OTHER PROVINCIAL REGULATION
The discussion to this point has centered on the federal control of
pension funds (both direct and indirect) and the provincial regulation
181. Id.
182. Presumably, few bargaining agents for an employee would agree to such an
immediate imposition of tax on "savings."
183. Id. § 79C(1)(a).
184. Id.
185. See STRIKEMAN, CANADA TAX SERVICE, 79-714.
186. CANADIAN DEP'T OF FINANCE, PROPOSALS FOR TAX REFORM, THE WHITE PAPER
(Ottawa 1969).
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in Ontario. The following will be a very brief summary of the control of
pension funds in the remaining nine provinces.
a) Quebec
It was noted earlier that the Canada Pension Plan, so vitally
affecting the structure of national pension plans, was only applicable
to nine provinces and excluded Quebec. A comparable comprehensive
statute for the province of Quebec was passed and entitled the Quebec
Pension Plan. 187 The result is that Quebec has a "miniature" Canada
Pension Plan requiring no constitutional amendment, and preserving
complete provincial jurisdiction with reference to Quebec
contributors. There is provision for tie-in with the Canada Pension
Plan. If contributors move outside the province, contributions are
collected by the federal government and returned to the Quebec
Pension management group. This legislation does not affect the Old
Age Security Act, which provides additional subsistence benefits.'8 8
By way of further comparison to Ontario, the Pension Benefits
Standards Act of Ontario is paralleled almost entirely by the Quebec
Supplemental Pension Plans Act.'89 Regulation and control is highly
similar to that in Ontario, and bears the same tie-in pursuant to the
uniform standards provision in each of the provinces. 90
The result is a similar control over pension funds with the additional
provincial jurisdiction applied to subsistence benefits. The federal
legislation affects subsistence with the Old Age Security Act; there is
a measure of control through the deductibility provision under the
Income Tax Act; the provincial Pension Benefits Standards Act is
paralleled by a Quebec Act, the only difference being a provincial
pension plan in substitution for the federal one.
b) Uniformity of Regulation
It should be noted that each province has enacted its own form of the
Pension Benefits Act of Ontario. For the most part, the provinces have
uniformity of pension regulation, since the Ontario study was used by
all the provinces as a rationale for their own Acts.' 9' Portability and
investment control provisions exist in all the provincial acts. Finally,
there are provisions for mutual registration. There is, in sum, inter-
provincial cooperation.
187. STAT. QUE. 1965, vol. 1, 13-14 Eliz. II, c. 24.
188. Id. part 1.
189. Id.
190. Id. § 10.
191. See Comments on Interprovincial Conference of Premiers.
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9. CONCLUSION
Control over pension funds in Canada can therefore be summarized
as follows:
a) the establishment and administration of a profit sharing plan,
although theoretically affected by collective bargaining, is left
generally to the initiative of management;
b) subsistence levels are maintained by the federal government,
pursuant to its Canada Pension Plan and Old Age Security Act;
c) the desirability and structuring of pension plans in Canada is
vitally affected by provisions of the Income Tax Act;
d) the province of Quebec has taken a measure of the subsistence
levels unto itself pursuant to the Quebec Pension Plan Act;
e) all provinces have a comprehensive provincial statute controlling
the practical administration and investment requirements of pension
funds in Canada.
